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VALUATION IN COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS:
CHOOSING BETWEEN OFFER PRICES AND
ASKING PRICES AS THE APPROPRIATE
MEASURE OF WILLINGNESS TO PAY
GREGORY CRESPI*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Cost-benefit analysis is a well-known technique for evaluating
the merits of a policy by attempting to quantify in financial terms
all of the costs and benefits that will result from its
implementation. The core principle of the approach is to mimic
the operation of competitive markets by valuing all impacts of the
policy under consideration
in accordance with the affected persons'
"willingness to pay"1 to gain its benefits or avoid its costs.2 Stated
in more theoretical terms, cost-benefit analysis is an attempt to
determine the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency consequences of a policy' so
Professor

of Law, Dedman School of Law, Southern Methodist
University. J.D. 1985, Yale Law School, Ph.D. 1978, University of Iowa. I
would like to thank Richard Parker for the invaluable assistance that he has
provided to me both in researching and in writing this article, and Russell
Korobkin for his insightful comments on an earlier draft of this article.
1. In this article I will use the phrase "willingness to pay" to refer
generically to the valuation of impacts in accordance with the subjective
valuation of the persons' affected, without regard to whether this valuation
represents an offer price or instead an asking price, and without regard to
whether this valuation was derived from revealed preference data or by some
form of contingent valuation evidence obtained in the absence of revealed
preference data.
2. For a comprehensive discussion of the many aspects of cost-benefit
analysis, see generally ANTHONY E. BOARDMAN ET AL., COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS: CONCEPTS AND PRACTICE (1996); E. J. MISHAN, COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS (1971).
3. A policy will constitute a Kaldor-Hicks improvement - a move towards
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency if the total benefits of the policy exceed its total
costs, with both benefits and costs measured by the "willingness to pay" of the
affected persons to obtain those benefits or avoid those costs. RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 13 (6th ed. 2003). The Kaldor-Hicks
criterion is the usual measure of efficiency utilized by economists. Id. The
seminal articles that developed the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency concept are John
R. Hicks, The Foundationsof Welfare Economics, 49 ECON. J. 696 (1939), and
Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal
Comparisons of Utility, 49 ECON. J. 549 (1939).
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that this information can guide the decision whether or not to
implement that policy.
Cost-benefit analysis currently plays a particularly important
role in federal administrative rulemaking. While this method of
evaluation was used to some extent in regulatory reviews under
the Nixon, Ford, and Carter Administrations,4 its significance was
greatly enhanced by Executive Order 12991, issued in 1981 by
President Reagan.5
Executive Order 12991 required many
proposed executive branch regulatory initiatives
to be
accompanied by a Regulatory Impact Analysis containing an
extensive cost-benefit analysis of the proposal that had to be
submitted to and approved by the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs ("OIRA"), a new office created within the Office
of Management and Budget ("OMB"), before the proposed
regulation could become effective.6 Congress has also enacted
numerous statutes in recent years requiring federal agencies to
perform cost-benefit analyses in connection with their rulemaking
efforts. 7
Prospective cost-benefit analyses of rulemaking
initiatives and subsequent OIRA review (and, upon occasion, also
judicial review8 ) thereof now appear to be a permanent and
significant feature of the federal regulatory process; similarly,
cost-benefit analyses are now also utilized to a lesser extent by
many state governmental agencies.9 The prominent legal scholar,
4. President Nixon created a "Quality of Life Review" that gave the Office
of Management and Budget limited regulatory review authority. President
Ford then required several federal agencies to also provide inflation impact
statements for review by the Council on Wage and Price Stability. President
Carter took another significant step towards institutionalizing cost-benefit
analysis as an aspect of federal rulemaking when he established the
Regulatory Analysis Review Group and issued Executive Order 12044 which
required economic impact statements for all proposed rules having an overall
impact of more than $100 million. See generally Murray Weidenbaum,
Regulatory Process Reform from Ford to Clinton, 20 REG. 20 (1997), available
at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/reg20nla.html (last visited Nov. 29,
2005); THOMAS 0. MCGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF
REGULATORY ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY (1991).

5. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 17, 1981).
6. 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193. See also MCGARITY, supra note 4, at 271
(discussing the actions of OIRA in connection with the instigation and review
of the cost-benefit analyses prepared in connection with Executive Order
12,291). The Clinton Administration replaced Executive Order 12,991 with a
new Executive Order 12,866 which made some minor changes in wording and
procedures, but retained the substance of the cost-benefit analysis
requirement for major rulemaking initiatives. Exec. Order No. 12,866 58 Fed.
Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993).
7. Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis,
109 YALE L.J. 165, 167 (1999) (citing to a law review article which in turn cites
several such statutes).
8. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE OF
REGULATORY PROTECTION 10 (2002).
9. See generally Robert W. Hahn, State and FederalRegulatory Reform: A

20061

The AppropriateMeasure of Willingness to Pay

Cass Sunstein, has gone so far as to claim that "American
government is becoming a cost-benefit state,"" and that the use of
cost-benefit analysis helps rationalize government decisionmaking and insulate it from the pressure of special interest
groups, as well as increase regulatory transparency and public
accountability." Both Sunstein's descriptive and normative claims
are open to challenge. 2
In particular, there is considerable
controversy regarding whether cost-benefit analysis provides a
meaningful and unbiased means of assessing the desirability of
policies and programs. 3 The literature on this topic is extensive,
including a number of articles that sharply criticize of the use of
this approach."'
The various normative critiques that have been made of costbenefit analysis can be usefully classified as being either
"external" or "internal" critiques.'"
Many external critiques
emphasize the threshold problem of incommensurability,
commonly concluding that cost-benefit analysis is fatally flawed
because of the impossibility of meaningfully measuring diverse
impacts, ranging from purely financial consequences to loss of life
itself, and including unquantifiable effects such as the value of
empathy with those persons more directly affected by a policy, by a
unitary monetary metric. 6 Other external critiques focus upon the
weaknesses of economic efficiency as a normative standard.'
ComparativeAnalysis, 29 J. LEGAL STuD. 873 (2000).
10. SUNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 19-20.
11. Id. at 26-28.
12. See generally Amy Sinden, Cass Sunstein's Cost-Benefit Lite: Economics
for Liberals, 29 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 191 (2004) (rebutting both claims in some
detail).
13. Id. at 201-12. There is a voluminous body of literature offering
criticisms of cost-benefit analysis. See also, Adler & Posner, supra note 7 at
167 ("The reputation of cost-benefit analysis ... among American academics
has never been as poor as it is today.... "); Frank Ackerman & Liza
Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis of Environmental
Protection, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1553 (2002) (presenting a highly critical view of
cost-benefit analysis).
14. See, e.g., Adler & Posner, supra note 7; Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra
note 13.
15. Sinden, supra note 12, at 202.
16. Id. There is extensive literature advancing external critiques of the
cost-benefit methodology based on the incommensurability problem. See, e.g.,
Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 13, at 1553, 1563-64; Henry S.
Richardson, The Stupidity of the Cost-Benefit Standard 29 J. LEGAL STUD.
971, 986-89 (2000); Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions,
107 YALE L. J. 1981, 1984-1985 (1998); Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability
and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779, 784 (1994); Laurence H. Tribe,
Policy Science: Analysis or Ideology?, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 66 (1972).
17. There is extensive literature criticizing the use of economic efficiency as
a normative criterion. See, e.g., Adler & Posner, supra note 7, at 191
("[B]ecause Kaldor-Hicks [efficiency] is, taken as a moral principle, unsound,
CBA (cost-benefit analysis) cannot be justified by reference to Kaldor-Hicks.");
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The
internal
critiques,
in contrast, sidestep . the
incommensurability problem and accept as a premise the
desirability of valuing a policy through aggregating in financial
terms the affected persons' "willingness to pay" to enjoy or to avoid
its consequences. The internal critics address the cost-benefit
methodology on its own terms and point out a number of valuation
problems that, alone or in combination, may often render futile
attempts to quantify costs and benefits in an objective manner
(i.e., that do not simply reflect the analyst's personal, ethical, and
political preferences). 8
The problems noted by these critics
include the difficulty in determining appropriate discount rates, 9
the problem of determining whether offer prices or asking prices
are the appropriate measure of "willingness to pay"2" in instances
where they diverge in magnitude," and the dependence of
"willingness to pay"-based measures of offer prices or asking prices
on the existing distribution of wealth.' Critics also emphasize the
often severe data availability limitations facing cost-benefit
analysts, including the common difficulty of having inadequate

Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 13, at 1567-68; Gregory Scott Crespi, The
Mid-Life Crisis of the Law and Economics Movement: Confronting the
Problems of Nonfalsifiability and Normative Bias, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
231, 234-37(1991); MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 11450 (1987). See generally Symposium, Efficiency as a Legal Concern, 8
HOFSTRA L. REV. 485 (1980) (collecting several articles on economic efficiency).
18. Adler & Posner, supra note 7, at 202-03. There is extensive literature
advancing such internal critiques of the cost-benefit methodology. See, e.g.,
Sinden, supra note 12, at 205-10 (citing many articles presenting such
critiques). See also, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, CostBenefit Analysis, and the Discountingof Human Lives, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 941
(1999) (criticizing commonly used approaches to discounting future loss of life
consequences).
19. See, e.g., Sinden, supra note 12, at 207-08 (stating that there is
controversy over the appropriate discount rate to apply to market goods
because "reasonable people can obviously disagree about inflation and interest
rates").
20. In this article I will consistently use the phrase "offer price" for the
amount of money that a person would be willing to pay to obtain a benefit or to
avoid a cost. In the economics and regulatory analysis literature offer prices
are often also referred to as 'willingness to pay" or "WTP" measures.
Similarly, I will consistently use the phrase "asking price" for the amount of
money someone would require to consent to forego a benefit or bear a cost. In
the economics and regulatory analysis literature asking prices are often also
referred to as "willingness to ask" or "WTA" measures.
21. "The existence of... [a divergence between offer and asking prices]
presents an intellectual challenge. Which price ... should the policymaker
use in comparing how much potential owners value an entitlement? The
offer/asking price gap necessitates a more subtle inquiry than traditional
efficiency analysis."
Russell Korobkin, Note, Policymaking and the
Offer/Asking Price Gap: Towards a Theory of Efficient EntitlementAllocation,
46 STAN. L. REV. 663, 665 (1994) [hereinafter Korobkin (1994)].
22. Sinden, supra note 12, at 206-07.
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data to confidently establish the "willingness to pay" of affected
persons for even the known impacts of a measure, 3 as well as the
more fundamental problem of scientific uncertainty as to both the
scope and magnitude of the likely consequences of many policies or
24
programs.
In this Article I will not address the merits of the external
critiques of cost-benefit analysis, or the majority of the internal
critiques. Rather, I will focus almost exclusively upon the specific
and important question of whether offer price or asking prices are
the theoretically appropriate measure in determining "willingness
to pay" and overall efficiency consequences. My goal is to build
upon and significantly advance the state of analysis with regard to
the choice between these alternative valuation methods. Let me at
the outset briefly summarize my overall conclusions and
recommendations.
Empirical evidence demonstrates that there is a pervasive
and often significant divergence between offer price and asking
price measures of the "willingness to pay" for the various costs and
benefits of many policies. Asking prices can easily be several
times larger than comparable offer prices." The use of offer price
instead of asking prices for valuation of a policy's cost impacts can
consequently lead to significant underestimates of costs relative to
benefits and ultimately an incorrect assessment of that policy's
efficiency. This potential divergence between offer and asking
prices therefore requires cost-benefit analysts who seek to
accurately assess the efficiency consequences of a policy, rather
than simply to promote or discredit that policy in accordance with
a particular political agenda that may include objectives other
than efficiency,"
to choose the appropriate measurement
approach to value particular benefit and cost items that best
assess those efficiency consequences considering the constraints
presented by the available data. 7
In my opinion, the pre-policy status quo is the appropriate
baseline state to use as a reference point for defining the benefits
and costs of implementing a policy." Under all circumstances, the
benefits of a policy should then be valued through use of the offer
23. See id. at 208-10 (discussing several problems which call into question
the validity and reliability of various methods of measuring willingness to
pay).
24. See generally id. at 205-12.
25. See generally infra note 48.
26. My subsequent recommendations made in this article are based upon
the assumption that the only proper objective of cost-benefit analysis is the
limited goal of assessing those efficiency consequences, and that the valuation
approach should be selected with this goal uppermost in mind. See infra text
accompanying notes 187-88.

27. Id.
28. See infra notes 188-89 and accompanying text.
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prices of the policy's beneficiaries as compared to that initial
baseline, regardless of whether the policy beneficiaries will also be
accorded legal entitlements to those benefits as part of that
policy. 9
The proper measurement of the costs of a policy is a far more
complex undertaking than is valuing its benefits.
In those
instances where the losers from a policy have legal entitlements
that would be contravened if those losses are imposed, their losses
should be valued at their asking prices, not at their offer prices.
As I will discuss in some detail, persuasive theoretical arguments
can be made that these asking prices should first be adjusted in a
number of subtle and possibly significant ways when assessing
typical policies not involving asking price-based compensation
payments being made to the losers. However, given that these
various adjustments to some extent would offset one another, and
given that the available data is generally inadequate to measure
the appropriate size of the particular individual adjustments with
any real precision, I conclude that unadjusted asking prices are
the most appropriate metric for practical policy analysis. Despite
the potential error that may be introduced by overlooking these
adjustments, asking prices are still likely to be far more accurate
approximations of the true "willingness to pay" to avoid cost
burdens than would be offer prices, and are therefore superior
valuation measures in any context where accuracy of result, rather
than ease of data collection, is the paramount consideration. With
regard to losses that are not protected by legal entitlements, I
again conclude for similar reasons that they should be measured
by the losers' asking prices, without adjustments. °
These conclusions have very significant implications for the
conduct of cost-benefit analysis. Currently, the common practice
among cost-benefit analysts is to uncritically utilize offer prices for
valuing both costs and benefits,3' largely because of either
widespread (though unfounded") perceptions that the difference
between these measures is insignificant 3' or because of the

29. See infra notes 189-96 and accompanying text.
30. Although this conclusion on my part regarding the proper valuation of
costs not accompanied by legal entitlements is somewhat more tentative than
my conclusion regarding the valuation of costs imposed that contravene legal
entitlements. See infra notes 209-10 and accompanying text.
31. See, OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL
REGULATIONS UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12,866, (1996) [hereinafter OMB
(1996)], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeglriaguide.html
(last visited on Nov. 30, 2005) (noting that there is a "common preference" for
the use of offer prices over the use of asking prices by cost-benefit analysts,
based on empirical difficulties in measuring asking prices).
32. See infra note 48 and accompanying text.
33. See Jack L. Knetsch, Environmental Policy Implications of Disparities
Between Willingness to Pay and Compensation Demanded measures of Values,
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generally greater ease of measurement of offer prices compared to
asking prices, 4 rather than for any sound theoretical reasons
suggesting that offer prices are a better means of assessing
efficiency consequences. Since asking prices are often larger than
offer prices, and sometimes several times larger,"5 the adoption of
my recommendations would, in some instances, lead to a different
conclusion as to the efficiency of a proposal.
Indeed, more
proposals would be revealed as inefficient when their costs are
more accurately estimated. This would particularly be the case
with regard to proposals whose costs include the sort of effects one
would expect to result in asking prices well in excess of offer
prices, such as when those costs include adverse environmental
impacts or adverse health or safety consequences."
This Article will proceed in the following manner. Section
II will examine when offer prices rather than asking prices are the
theoretically appropriate measures of "willingness to pay" for a
policy's costs or benefits. First, I will briefly discuss the evidence
indicating the existence of a pervasive and often substantial
divergence between offer prices and asking prices that requires for
the accurate assessment of efficiency consequences that a
considered valuation method choice be made for each class of
impacts. Then, I will survey and discuss the existing literature on
this question of the appropriate means of measuring "willingness
to pay" in circumstances where offer prices and asking prices
diverge significantly.
I will focus primarily on the seminal
contributions made by Duncan Kennedy37 and Russell Korobkin,"
but I will also discuss the work of Frank Michelman,39 Jack
Knetsch, ° Richard Markovits,4' Herbert Hovenkamp, 24 Elizabeth

18 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 227, 227 (1990) [hereinafter Knetsch (1990)]
("[T]he usual advice is that as a practical matter is usually does not make
much difference which of these two approaches [offer prices or asking
prices] ... is adopted.").

34. See id. ("Generally speaking, willingness to pay [offer prices] is easier to
estimate than required compensation [asking prices]."); A.V. KNEESE,
MEASURING THE BENEFITS OF CLEAN AIR AND WATER 15 (1984). See also NICK
HANLEY

AND

CLIVE

L.

SPASH,

COST-BENEFIT

ANALYSIS

AND

THE

ENVIRONMENT 62-65 (1993) (noting and discussing the fact that attempts to

measure asking prices through survey formats "are particularly prone to a
large frequency of protest bids and/or a large frequency of outliers.").
35. See generally infra note 48 (reasoning that the endowment effect is the
cause of the gap between offer and asking price).
36. Knetsch (1990), supra note 33, at 231.
37. See infra text accompanying notes 85-104.
38. See infra text accompanying notes 128-71.
39. See infra text accompanying notes 62-67.
40. See infra text accompanying notes 105-15.
41. See infra text accompanying notes 68-77.
42. See infra text accompanying notes 116-18.
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Hoffman' and Matthew Spitzer." I will also discuss the guidance
provided periodically by the OMB for government analysts who
must prepare their agencies' Regulatory Impact Analyses of
proposed regulations for OIRA review. Finally, I will offer my own
contributions to this discussion and advance my personal
conclusions and recommendations. Section III will present an
overall conclusion and briefly discuss the practical implications of
my recommendations.

II. OFFER PRICES V. ASKING PRICES AS THE APPROPRIATE MEASURE
OF WILLINGNESS TO PAY

A. The Pervasive and Often SignificantDifference Between Offer
Prices and Asking Prices
Prior to the late 1970s, it was generally assumed by
economists that the value that a rational person would place upon
an entitlement was independent of whether that person owned
that entitlement, except for any differences in valuation resulting
from the wealth effects of the assignment of the entitlement in
cases when that entitlement constituted an appreciable fraction of
the person's wealth.' The famous Coase Theorem, declaring that
under circumstances of zero transaction costs the allocation of
resources agreed to by two parties inter se will be invariant with
respect to which of them is initially accorded the entitlement at
issue, except for the consequences of possible wealth effects
resulting from the locus of the initial assignment, is predicated
upon this assumption of the equivalence of offer and asking prices
for each of the parties involved.47 Most normative analyses of
entitlement regimes in legal scholarship still rely upon the
assumption of equivalence between offer and asking prices,' and
most cost-benefit analyses are conducted using- the often more
easily measured offer prices49 rather than asking prices, assuming
that the results reached will not be affected by this choice of
valuation approaches.

43. See infra text accompanying notes 119-27.
44. Id.
45. See infra text accompanying notes 171-88.
46. See, e.g., Robert Willig, Consumers Surplus Without Apology, 66 AM.
ECON. REV. 589 (1976) (arguing that offer prices and asking prices will diverge
significantly only under unusual circumstances).
47. See Korobkin (1994), supra note 21, at 663-65 (evaluating the Coase
Theorem in detail).
48. Russell Korobkin, Empirical Legal Realism: A New Social Scientific
Assessment of Law and Human Behavior: The Endowment Effect and Legal
Analysis, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1227, 1228 (2003) [hereinafter Korobkin (2003)].
49. OMB (1996), supra note 31, at 21-22.
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However, a large and robust body of empirical research
carried out in recent decades has rather conclusively demonstrated
that under many circumstances this assumption of equivalent
offer and asking prices is incorrect. ° A person's asking price to
relinquish an entitlement or other benefit they enjoy is often
greater than would be their offer price to purchase the same
entitlement or benefit, if they did not already enjoy it, by an
amount that significantly exceeds any differential that could be
plausibly attributed to the wealth effect of initially owning that
benefit or entitlement."' The same empirical literature also
evidences that this divergence between offer and asking prices now commonly referred to as the "endowment effect," 2 - is
analytically unruly in that it is widely pervasive but not
universally present," stems from numerous underlying causes,'
and is very context-specific both 5 in its magnitude and in the
specific mix of factors that cause it. 5
Recognition of this pervasive and variable divergence between
offer and asking prices greatly complicates cost-benefit analysis.

50. For a comprehensive 1993 review of the empirical literature then
available, which review concludes that asking prices often exceed offer prices
and often by a substantial multiple, see generally Elizabeth Hoffman &
Matthew L. Spitzer, Willingness to Pay vs. Willingness to Accept: Legal and
Economic Implications, 71 WASH. U.. L.Q. 59 (1993). See also Peter A.
Diamond & Ferry A. Hausman, CV Measurement of Nonuse Values, in
CONTINGENT VALUATION: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 21-22 (Jerry A. Hausman

ed., 1993); Peter A. Diamond et al., Does CV Measure Preferences?, in
CONTINGENT VALUATION: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 65-66 (Jerry A. Hausman

ed., 1993); Paul Milgrom, Philosophy, Economics, and CV, in CONTINGENT
VALUATION: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 429-31 (Jerry A. Hausman ed., 1993)

(taking the same position); Knetsch (1990), supra note 33, at 227 ("virtually all
controlled tests ... point to large differences between the alternative value
measures [of offer and asking prices].").
There has been considerable
additional research done since 1993 which lends further support of this
conclusion. Korobkin (2003), supra note 48, at 1231-35; Korobkin (1994),
supra note 21, at 668 ("In the aggregate, the environmental studies tend to
reveal WTAs [asking prices] from two to ten times as high as WTPs [offer
prices], with some surveys showing WTAs sixty to ninety times as high as
WTPs."). See also Cass Sunstein, Lives, Life-Years, and Willingness to Pay,
104 COLUM. L. REV. 205, 230 (2004) (concluding that there is a large difference
between offer and asking price); Thomas F. Cotter, Pragmatism,Economics,
and the Droit Moral, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1, 59 (1997) ("A growing body of empirical
evidence suggests that offer/asking price gaps are more common and larger
than conventional neoclassical economic theory had predicted.").
51. See generally Cotter, supra note 50, at 58-67 (illustrating the effect of
the offer/ask price gap).
52. The term "endowment effect" was coined by Richard Thaler. Korobkin
(2003), supra note 48, at 1228 n.3. See generally Richard Thaler, Toward a
Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 39, 44 (1980).
53. Korobkin (2003), supra note 48, at 1235.
54. Id. at 1242-55.
55. Id. at 1228-30.
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Such analysis involves a calculation of the overall efficiency
consequences of a policy, as compared to some baseline state of
affairs, where the benefits conferred or costs imposed upon each
affected person in each time period are valued at that person's
"willingness to pay," and are then aggregated over all affected
persons and time periods to give an overall assessment of the
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency properties of the policy. If there is a
significant divergence between offer prices and asking prices for
some or all of the more substantial benefits or costs of a particular
policy, then the choice of valuation approach may well determine
the outcome of the analysis.
It is therefore crucial for the
credibility and analytical value of cost-benefit analysis that the
analyst makes this choice with an eye towards best assessing
economic efficiency consequences, rather than promoting other
possible political objectives.
Offer prices are often more easily measured than asking
prices.'
It would be very convenient for cost-benefit analysts if
offer prices could simply be used as the basis for calculating a
proxy measure for asking prices whenever asking prices are the
theoretically appropriate measure of "willingness to pay."
Unfortunately, this is not the case because offer prices may be
significantly smaller than asking prices for particular impacts of a
policy - sometimes by amounts that vary greatly with the context
so that a simple across-the-board proportional upward
adjustment of offer prices to accurately correct for this divergence
is not possible. It is therefore necessary for cost-benefit analysts
to explicitly choose between offer price and asking price measures
of the "willingness to pay" for each of the various consequences of
the policy under consideration, and only utilize offer price
measures when it is theoretically appropriate to do so. There may
be unusual circumstances where while asking prices are the
theoretically suitable measure, one has available the data
necessary to determine the appropriate size of the adjustments
needed to make adjusted offer prices a reasonably accurate proxy
measure for those asking prices, but this is not the usual situation.
B. ChoosingBetween Offer Price and Asking Price Measures of
Willingness to Pay
Over the past several decades a number of economists and
legal scholars have attempted to determine whether offer prices or
asking prices are the appropriate measures of "willingness to pay"
when conducting a cost-benefit analysis.57 Currently, conventional
56. OMB (1996), supra note 31, at 22.
57. See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness:
Comments on the Ethical Foundations of 'Just Compensation' Law, 80 HARV.
L. REV. 1165, 1214 (1967); Richard S. Markovits, The Causes and Policy
Significance of Pareto Resource Misallocation:A Checklist for Micro-Economic
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wisdom is that while some progress has been made,58 the effort has
failed to reach a definitive conclusion. Indeed, "no one has been
able to come up with a theoretically defensible basis on which to
choose one value over the other"59 as best representing "willingness
to pay"; thus threatening to render cost-benefit analysis
indeterminate on that basis alone in any context where there may
be a significant divergence between offer prices and asking prices
for some important class of policy consequences.
In my opinion, however, such a sweeping dismissal of this
body of analytical work is unwarranted. As I will discuss below, it
is true that a number of conflicting resolutions to this valuation
question have been proposed, and some of them are not supported
by convincing rationales. It is also true that even the more

Policy Analysis, 28 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1975) [hereinafter Markovits (1975)];
Thomas C. Heller, The Importance of Normative Decision-Making: The
Limitations of Legal Economics as a Basis for a Liberal Jurisprudence-As
Illustrated by the Regulation of Vacation Home Development, 1976 WiS. L.
REV. 385, 439-46 (1976); Mark Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production
Theory, and Ideology in the Coase Theorem, 52. S. CAL. L. REV. 669, 685-96
(1979); Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A
Critique,33 STAN. L. REV. 387, 401-21 (1981); Richard Markovits, Duncan'sDo
Nots: Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Determination of Legal Entitlements, 36
STAN. L. REV. 1169, 1178-84 (1984) [hereinafter Markovits (1984)]; Jack L.
Knetsch, Legal Rules and the Basis for Evaluating Economic Losses, 4 INT.
REV. L. & ECON. 5, 11-12 (1984) [hereinafter Knetsch (1984)]; Knetsch (1990),
supra note 33; Herbert Hovenkamp, Legal Policy and the Endowment Effect,
20 J. LEGAL STUD. 225 (1991); W. Michael Haneman, Willingness to Pay and
Willingness to Accept: How Much Can They Differ?, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 635
(1991); David Cohen & Jack L. Knetsch, Judicial Choice and Disparities
Between Measures of Economic Values, 30 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 737, 742-49
(1992); Hoffman & Spitzer, supra note 50, at 98-114; Korobkin (1994), supra
note 21; Jason F. Shogren & Dermot J. Hayes, Resolving Differences in
Willingness to Pay and Willingness to Accept: Reply, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 241
(1997); Murray B. Rutherford, Jack L. Knetsch, & Thomas C. Brown,
Assessing Environmental Losses: Judgments of Importance and Damage
Schedules, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 51, 60-63 (1998); Richard T. Carson,
Nicholas E. Flores, & Norman F. Meade, Contingent Valuation: Controversies
and Evidence, 19 ENVTL. & RES. ECON. 173, 185-86 (2001); Korobkin (2003),
supra note 48, at 1231-83. For federal Office of Management and Budget
perspectives on the appropriate measurement of "willingness to pay," see
generally OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, GUIDELINES TO STANDARDIZE
MEASURES OF COSTS AND BENEFITS AND THE FORMAT OF ACCOUNTING
at
STATEMENTS,
(2000),
available

http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/memoranda/mOO-08.pdf (last visited Dec. 2,
2005); DRAFT 2003 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF
FEDERAL REGULATIONS, 68 Fed. Reg. 5,492, 5,513 (Feb. 3, 2003), availableat
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/fedreg/2003draft-cost-benefit-rpt.pdf
(last
visited on Nov. 30, 2005).
58. Cass R. Sunstein, Switching the Default Rule, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 106,
130 (2002) ("In asking about whether to use WTP or instead WTA, some
progress has been made on this question.").
59. Sinden, supra note 12, at 206.
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plausible conclusions reached by some scholars as to the
appropriate metric are dependent upon both their underlying
premises as to the purposes of conducting a cost-benefit analysis
and upon their assessment of the sources and magnitude of the
divergence between offer and asking prices.
As such, these
conclusions may in some instances require detailed data that is
rarely available. No single resolution of this question stands out
as being dominant across all possible initial premises and
assessments of the sources and magnitude of the divergence.
Nevertheless, that body of work taken as a whole provides useful
guidance for resolving the valuation question with regard to any
particular impact that is being assessed, and to any underlying
premises as to the purposes that the inquiry is intended to serve.6O
I believe that it is possible to reach rather general and robust
conclusions regarding the proper valuation approach from a close
consideration and synthesis of these prior efforts, and I will
attempt to demonstrate this below.
Let me first briefly and chronologically summarize6' each
major contribution made in recent years towards clarifying when
offer prices or instead asking prices are the appropriate measures
of "willingness to pay." I will also include in this discussion a few
comments regarding the merits of the various contributions.
Then, I will offer a more comprehensive assessment of this body of
literature taken as a whole. Finally, I will advance my own
contribution to this effort.
1. PriorEfforts to Determine the AppropriateMeasure of
Willingness to Pay
Frank Michelman was apparently the first legal scholar to
show some awareness of the offer/asking price ambiguity.62 In an
important passage in his 1967 HarvardLaw Review article dealing
with the scope of government compensation obligations, he defined

60. Sunstein, supra note 58.
61. This discussion will address the various critiques in chronological order,
except that the contributions of Russell Korobkin (first presented in a 1994
student note, Korobkin (1994), supra note 21, and subsequently expanded and
refined in a 2003 article, Korobkin (2003), supra note 48) will be discussed
together just after the pre-2003 contributions, and except that the
contributions of Richard Markovits (first introduced in a 1975 article,
Markovits (1975), supra note 57, and then elaborated much more fully in a
1984 article, Markovits (1984), supra note 57) will both be discussed together
just after the pre-1975 contributions, and except that the positions taken by
OIRA on this question over the years will be discussed after the discussion of
the Korobkin articles.
62. Michelman, supra note 57. See also Kennedy, supra note 57, at 403
("The use of asking prices to value externalities from the setting of
entitlements seems first to have occurred in Frank Michelman's classic article
on just compensation law.").
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"efficiency gains" as "the excess of benefits produced by a measure
over losses inflicted by it. ... "' He then stated that those benefits
should be measured "by the total number of dollars which
prospective gainers would be willing to pay to secure adoption" of
the measure,6 and that those costs should be measured "by the
total number of dollars which prospective losers would insist on as
the price of agreeing to adoption." In effect, he called for the use
of offer price measures for the benefits created by a policy, and
asking price measures for the costs imposed, in measuring net
efficiency gains.'
Michelman did not offer a reasoned elaboration of his
embrace of this sweeping "winners' offer prices, losers' asking
prices" 7 resolution of the offer/asking price problem. He implicitly
embraced a hypothetical competitive market valuation framework
and concluded that his valuation approach best replicated the
operation of such a market in which buyers must offer sellers a
sum that sellers are willing to accept for the transactions to occur.
Let me also note that Michelman drew no distinctions between: 1)
those losers who lose benefits to which they have a prior legal
entitlement, and 2) those losers who lose benefits to which they
had no prior legal entitlement, including those losers whose losses
are solely due to their empathy with those persons more directly
According to
affected by the measure under consideration.
Michelman, the adverse impacts of any kind of loss imposed by a
policy are to be valued at the losers' asking prices.
Richard Markovits was the next scholar to address these
questions, and in a rather opaque 1975 article' he declared in a
footnote that the winners' asking prices and the losers' offer prices
should be used to measure the impacts of a policy.69 This is in

63. Michelman, supra note 57, at 1214.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Michelman also defined two additional cost categories relevant to an
overall efficiency assessment. "Demoralization costs" are defined as "the dollar
value necessary to offset disutilities which accrue to losers and their
sympathizers specifically from the realization that no compensation is
offered." Id. "Settlement costs" are defined as the alternative to imposing
demoralization costs, i.e., "the dollar value of the time, effort and resources
which would be required in order to reach compensation settlements adequate

to avoid demoralization costs." Id. While this rudimentary threefold cost
categorization framework is somewhat awkward and potentially duplicative,

the key feature for our purposes is that each of these latter two cost items are
also to be valued by asking prices, not offer prices.
67. Duncan Kennedy colorfully refers to this valuation approach as
"'[w]inner's bribe losers' taken seriously." Kennedy, supra note 57, at 411.
68. Markovits (1975), supra note 57.
69. "I will measure the winners' gains from any policy by the number of
dollars they would be willing to accept in lieu of the change in question. ...
Similarly, the losers' losses should be measured according to the number of
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direct contrast to Michelman's valuation formula. In that footnote,
Markovits' justification for taking this approach was stated only
very briefly." However, it was later articulated somewhat more
fully and confidently declared to be the "correct" and "nonarbitrary way to measure" benefits and costs in a 1984 article7' he
wrote in response to Duncan Kennedy's article that will be
discussed in some detail below.7'
Markovits' arguments appear to be based upon the
assumption that the divergence between offer and asking prices
stems solely from the wealth effects caused by the allocation of the
entitlement at issue, and upon his recognition that this wealth
effect will not, in general, be offset by compensating payments
made as part of policy implementation. He concluded that it is
therefore appropriate to use the winners' asking prices and the
All of the responses to
losers' offer prices for valuations.73
Markovits' valuation approach of which I am aware are quite
dollars they would be willing to give up to prevent the change from being
adopted .... " Id. at 2-3 n.4.
70. Id.
71. Markovits (1984), supra note 57, at 1182.
72. See infra text accompanying note 82.
73. Markovits' basic rationale is quoted at some length below:
[M]easures of the equivalent dollar gains and losses.., can be accurate
only if they are based on accurate assumptions about the wealth
position of affected parties at the time at which the policy is
implemented. Since, in practice, the winners under a particular policy
will not have to pay a bribe to obtain that policy's implementation and
the losers will not be compensated for the loss which the policy imposes
upon them, cost-benefit analysts should measure the equivalent dollar
gains and losses that a policy will generate on the assumption that the
winners' and losers' wealth will not be altered prior to the policy's
implementation.... In other words, under my approach the gains of the
winners are measured (as they should be measured) by the number of
dollars which the winners would have to be given on top of their
original, actual wealth to be made as well off as they would be were the
policy implemented. Similarly, by measuring the losers' losses by the
number of dollars which they would have to lose to leave them as badly
off as the policy would leave them, my approach measures the dollar size
of their losses on the realistic assumption that their wealth will not be
increased prior to the adoption of the policy. That is, under my
approach the losers' losses are measured (as they should be measured)
by the amount by which their original, actual wealth would have to be
decreased for them to be as badly off as they would be were the policy
adopted.... The conventional approach [utilizing winners' offer prices
and losers' asking prices in accordance with Michelman's
recommendation] fails because in effect it measures the relevant
equivalent dollar gains and losses on false assumptions about the
amount of wealth which the winners and losers will have when the
policy is implemented.
Markovits (1984), supra note 57, at 1180-81 (emphasis added). Russell
Korobkin is in accord with my interpretation of Markovits' rationale for his
position. Korobkin (1994), supra note 21, at 677.
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critical of that position74 for one or more of three reasons: first, he
fails to distinguish for valuation purposes between losses protected
by legal entitlements and those that are not so protected; 75 second,
he fails to recognize that the wealth effects of many entitlements
will be insufficient to generate the magnitude of divergences
between offer and asking prices;" and finally, because he fails to
recognize that under his method of valuation both the
implementation of a policy and its subsequent reversal may each
be efficiency-enhancing, thus giving an indeterminate and
unhelpful cost-benefit analysis result that leads to cyclical policy
recommendations.7 7 I agree with these critics that Markovits'
approach is seriously flawed.
In 1976 Thomas Heller wrote an article which implicitly took
issue with Michelman's position that asking prices be used to
measure all costs that are imposed by policy measures. Heller
first drew a distinction between "property rights" and those "other
forms of legal entitlement" that do not provide for the full panoply
of property rights protections." For losses that are imposed in
contravention of property rights, he concluded that the proper
valuation of these costs is "the minimum amount an owner would
demand to be paid in order to have a money equivalent to the
value that consuming the asset would have yielded,"79 (i.e., the
losers' asking price). Conversely, for any losses associated with an
"entitlement in a resource which is less than a property right," the
proper measure of value is "the maximum amount that an
individual could pay for an asset and still leave his or her level of
welfare in the same position as if the asset had not been
purchased," ° (i.e., the losers' offer price).
Heller's use of the phrase "entitlement in a resource which is
less than a property right," apparently refers primarily to those
losses that are protected only by liability rules requiring the
payment of financial compensation for takings (e.g., most
contractual rights), and not by the full panoply of property rights
protections (e.g., the right to enjoin non-consensual takings).8 1
Losses not regarded as losses of entitlements, and consequently
not accorded any legal protection at all, would presumably, under
74. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 57, at 408-10; Korobkin (1994), supra
note 21, at 676-79.
75. Kennedy, supra note 57, at 408-10.
76. Korobkin (1994), supra note 21, at 678-79.
77. Id. at 676-78.
78. Heller, supra note 57, at 441.
79. Id. at 442.
80. Id.
81. Id. (citing the famous article, Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Malamed,
Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability:One View of the Cathedral,
85 HARv. L. REV. 1089 (1972) which developed the distinction between
property rules and liability rules).
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the Heller scheme, also be regarded as losses imposed on persons
who have "less than a property right" and would therefore be
treated in the same offer price fashion for "willingness to pay"
valuation purposes.
Heller therefore does not disagree with Michelman in regard
to the use of offer prices to measure benefits, nor with the use of
asking prices to measure those losses that involve entitlements
protected by property rights. However, Heller would instead use
offer prices to measure those losses of benefits that are protected
only by liability rules, or that otherwise receive no legal protection
at all. Unfortunately, Heller does not explain why the choice
between the use of offer or asking prices to measure the
"willingness to pay" to avoid losses should depend upon the nature
of the legal protection provided against the imposition of those
losses. As will be discussed below in connection with Duncan
Kennedy's work, a plausible, though debatable, argument can be
made for taking a different valuation approach for losses protected
by some form of legal entitlement from that taken for valuing
losses accorded no legal protection at all. It is not clear, however,
why the line crucial for valuation purposes should instead be
drawn between those losses protected by the full panoply of
property rights and those losses accorded some, but more limited
legal protection.
Duncan Kennedy in 1981 drew upon the work of Michelman,82
Heller,' and Markovits& to conduct a much more sophisticated
and insightful analysis of the offer/asking price conundrum than
had any of these earlier writers,' and for this reason Kennedy's
article is clearly the most widely read treatment of this topic.
Kennedy describes several possible approaches to determining
"willingness to pay," but his central point is that there is not only
no consensus among economists regarding when to use offer prices
and when to use asking prices,86 there is also ultimately no correct
answer implicit in the concept of efficiency.87 This problem renders
cost-benefit analysis inherently indeterminate and reduces it to
simply another "language for carrying on political discussion...
rather than a way of discovering facts about the external
world.... "'
One of the three valuation approaches Kennedy discusses is
described as the "traditional welfare economist's formula,"89 which

82. Kennedy, supra note 57, at 403-04.
83. Id. at 408-09.

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id.

408.
401-21.
407.
411.
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he colorfully labels "winners bribe losers, taken seriously."' In his
view, that approach calls for valuing gains from a policy at the
winners' offer prices and losses at the losers' asking prices; 91 this is
the same approach Michelman recommended over a decade
earlier.9" Kennedy then offers two criticisms of that approach.
First, he claims that it has a powerful bias in favor of preserving
the status quo since gains are measured by offer prices and losses
by often significantly larger asking prices. This obviously makes it
a dubious method of valuation for those persons who would deny
the legitimacy of the existing structure of entitlements.93 Second,
Kennedy notes that this approach leads to valuations that are
dependent on whether the initial status quo or instead the state of
affairs existing after implementation of the policy in question is
defined as the baseline.
While the initial status quo could
obviously be considered as the baseline, and offer and asking
prices for the benefit and cost impacts of a proposed measure
calculated accordingly, it is Kennedy's view that one could just as
reasonably regard the state of affairs after the implementation of
the measure with its resulting pattern of benefits and costs as the
valuation baseline. From that perspective, an attempt by the
losers to invoke state aid to undo the changes imposed and restore
their original entitlements and other benefits could be regarded as
the measure under consideration, thus reversing which effects are
to be measured by offer prices and which are to be measured by
asking prices.94 This analytical reversal will lead to an equally
powerful bias in favor of implementation of the policy and against
the initial status quo." In Kennedy's view, the fact that an analyst
can reasonably choose either of these two states as the valuation
baseline creates a degree of freedom that renders the efficiency
calculations potentially indeterminate in those instances where
there is a significant divergence between offer and asking prices
for the benefit or cost impacts at issue.
Kennedy then proposes a second, competing valuation
approach which he aptly labels "no transaction costs, taken
seriously."' This approach rests upon replicating a hypothetical
costless bargain among all affected persons, and upon recognizing
the significance of the bargaining leverage distinction between
persons whose losses of benefits are protected by legal
entitlements and persons whose losses are not so protected.
Under this approach, one would value gains at the winners' offer
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 411.
Id. 409-10.
Michelman, supra note 57, at 1214.
Kennedy, supra note 57, at 412-13.
Id. at 413-14.
Id. at 414.
Id. at 415.
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prices, and those losses suffered which are protected by legal
entitlements would be valued at the losers' asking prices.
However, those losses imposed upon losers without a legal
entitlement to the benefits lost would be valued only at those
losers' offer prices." This approach would, in Kennedy's view, best
replicate the hypothetical bargain that the parties would reach. In
such hypothetical negotiations, some potential losers would be
bargaining from entitlement positions and could therefore hold out
for their asking prices, while the potential winners and losers
without initial entitlement positions would have no such
bargaining leverage and their effective valuations for purposes of
those hypothetical negotiations would thus be more accurately
measured by their offer prices.98
Kennedy claims the indeterminacy of the "winners bribe
losers, taken seriously" method stemming from the freedom to
define either the initial status quo or the post-measure state of
affairs as the valuation baseline will not exist under this second
valuation method.99 However, he later identifies another source of
indeterminacy that plagues this "no transaction costs, taken
seriously" valuation method; the unrestricted choice available to
analysts in choosing between using offer or asking prices to value
losses of the nature of vicarious pain suffered by particular
persons stemming from the abridgement of other persons'
entitlements."° Kennedy's view is that one may choose to value
most losses not protected by legal entitlements at the losers' offer
prices, yet may nevertheless reasonably choose to value the subset
of those losses that are of the nature of vicarious pain experienced
as a result of others suffering losses protected by legal
entitlements at the vicarious losers' asking prices since such losses
have an entitlement infringement aspect (i.e., they are indirectly
generated by transgressions against persons whose losses are
protected by legal entitlements).
The degree of freedom in
valuation presented to analysts by this choice again raises

97. Id. at 414-19.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 415. However, there does not appear to be any inherent reason
why an analyst could not choose to use the post-measure state of affairs and
distribution of entitlements as the baseline against which to evaluate a
proposal to restore the initial situation, with the new entitlement structure
defining a new pattern of offer and asking price valuations. This would lead to
exactly the same potential baseline-choice indeterminacy problems that
Kennedy has identified for the "winners bribe losers, taken seriously" method.
100. Id. at 417-19. "Once we recognize that there might be good reason for
using C's asking price in deciding [the value ofi B's entitlement without

entitling C [to legally challenge the loss of B's entitlement] himself, it is clear
that there is a set of necessary choices to be made here as elsewhere." Id. at
418.
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potential indeterminacy concerns for this second valuation
approach as well.
The third possible method of valuation that Kennedy
proposes, perhaps with tongue-in-cheek, is "[tihe analyst makes up
her own mind."' Under this approach, the analyst simply chooses
to value particular impacts of a measure at offer prices or asking
prices on an ad hoc, selective basis with an eye towards reaching
an overall efficiency conclusion that will reinforce the result
favored by the analysts on political or ethical grounds." Kennedy
recognizes that candidly allowing for such unconstrained
flexibility in valuation would, under many circumstances where
the offer and asking prices diverge significantly, almost completely
undercut the credibility of cost-benefit analysis as an analytical
tool to assess efficiency consequences rather than only as a
rhetorical device to invoke essentially arbitrary numbers to
thereby further personal political purposes."
Nevertheless, he
concludes that this unconstrained approach is "the only coherent
procedure" for valuation because the indeterminacy of the other
two approaches also robs them of credibility for analytical
purposes, yet each approaches masks the indeterminacy with a
superficial patina of neutrality in valuation."°"
The next significant foray into this territory was a 1984
article written by the Canadian economist Jack Knetsch,'O
followed by a 1990 article in which he expanded upon his initial
conclusions."
In the 1984 article, Knetsch claimed that
conventional wisdom at that time accepted the Kennedy "no
transaction costs, taken seriously" approach under which gains are
measured by offer prices, and that losses of benefits protected by
legal entitlements are measured by asking prices, but that losses
of benefits not protected by entitlements are measured by offer
prices. O7 His disagreement with that approach was with regard to
its sharp dichotomy in the method of valuing losses with regard to
the presence or absence of the protection of legal entitlements. In
his view, people's expectations as to the extent of entitlement
protection accorded as to particular benefits they currently enjoy
do not simply slot into a binary "legal protection is present or
absent" classification. Instead, those expectations lie more along a
continuum as to the perceived reliability of such legal protection if
101. Id. at 410.
102. Id. at 410-11.
103. Id. at 411.
104. Id. Perhaps a better term here than "coherent" would be "candid." The
other two approaches discussed are each logically coherent but, in Kennedy's
view, are flawed in that they mask an implicit and debatable valuation
assumption which may heavily bias the resulting calculations.
105. Knetsch (1984), supra note 57.
106. Knetsch (1990), supra note 33.
107. Knetsch (1984), supra note 57, at 11.
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sought to prevent infringements. 08
Additionally, these
expectations may vary along another dimension regarding the
extent to which people anticipate that others who hold the legal
entitlements will invoke formal enforcement of those rights."
According to Knetsch, people tend to discount their valuations of a
benefit in accordance with their perception of how tenuous their
legal rights are with respect to those benefits,10 as well as how
likely they believe it is that others will assert conflicting legal
rights."' He therefore argues that asking prices are a more
appropriate measure of "willingness to pay" for cost burdens than
offer prices. Knetsch maintains this position, even in instances
where the losers' extent of entitlement protection is unclear or
absent altogether, noting that asking prices are sensitive to these
gradations in the levels of expected legal protection of the current
enjoyment of benefits,"2 as well as to the strength of expectations
held with regard to the necessity3 of having legal protection to
maintain that current enjoyment."
The difference in the method of valuation of losses between
Kennedy's "no transaction costs, taken seriously" approach and
Knetsch's suggested use of asking prices for all losses may be
somewhat more significant in theory than in practice. This is
108. Id.
"The welfare associated with any set of expectations and entitlements
will likely, all other things equal, reflect their security; more tenuous
ones will be discounted relative to ones more certain of protection. Any
change in circumstances that adversely affected an expectation, even
one known to be tenuous, would decrease the well-being of the
individual. If the intent is to measure this welfare cost.., it might then
best be done in terms of the lump sum necessary to leave the person as
well off as she or he would be without the change in expectations-the
minimum compensation demanded [asking price] measure.
The
expectation might well be unwarranted... but the welfare change
would still be best put and most appropriately measured in terms of the
necessary compensation."
Id.
109. Id. Knetsch notes that the reference point from which people value
gains or losses may not accord with their understanding of the scope of their
legal entitlements. Knetsch (1990), supra note 33, at 235 (citing to Robert
Ellickson's famous Shasta County study; Robert Ellickson, A Critique of
Economic and Sociological Theories of Social Control, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 67
(1987)).
110. Knetsch (1984), supra note 57, at 11.
111. Knetsch (1990), supra note 33, at 235.
112. Id. In a later co-authored article Knetsch again claims that asking
prices, rather than offer prices, should be used to measure the value of losses
in the specific context of non-pecuniary environmental losses. Rutherford,
Knetsch & Brown, supra note 57, at 60-61. In that article, however, he
supports this claim only by quoting Michelman's 1967 article, and does not
propose discounting for the strength of expectations of legal protection
argument in favor of the use of asking prices.
113. Knetsch (1990), supra note 33, at 235.
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because the divergence between the amount of a person's asking
and offer price for a particular loss will, as Knetsch notes, likely
decline in size as the affected person's expectation of legal and/or
social norm protection against that loss diminishes.114 However,
even under circumstances in which a person understands that he
has absolutely no chance of invoking a legal entitlement to protect
his enjoyment of certain benefits, his asking price to part with
those benefits may for other reasons. exceed his offer price to
obtain those benefits (assuming he did not possess them), making
the choice between the two valuation approaches potentially
significant for the results reached in a cost-benefit analysis.
In 1991, Herbert Hovenkamp proposed the use of asking
prices to calculate the value of all benefits and all costs resulting
from a measure." 6 The essence of his argument is that offer prices
do not accurately reflect valuations of either benefits or costs
because offer prices are constrained by people's wealth, whereas
asking prices are not so constrained." 7 Such an argument shows
an unfortunate misunderstanding as to what is at issue in the
offer/asking price conundrum.
Hovenkamp's point regarding the differential effects of wealth
constraints on offer and asking prices obviously has some validity,
because a person's asking price to relinquish a particular benefit
could conceivably be very large, or even infinite, while his offer
price to obtain that benefit is constrained by his wealth and is
necessarily finite."' The potential differential impact of wealth
constraints on the two measures could perhaps be a valid objection
to the use of offer prices instead of asking prices in an attempt to
measure the strength of people's subjective preferences in some
explicitly utilitarian calculation. However, cost-benefit analysis is
a more circumscribed exercise intended to determine whether a
policy enhances efficiency as defined by "willingness to pay," and
not whether it would pass muster under a broader utilitarian
114. Knetsch (1984), supra note 57, at 11.
115. One may, for "endowment effect" reasons, have an asking price
valuation for a currently enjoyed benefit that exceeds one's offer price
valuation even when one has no expectation of being accorded legal protection
to continued enjoyment. For extensive discussion of the endowment effect see
generally Korobkin (2003), supra note 48; see also infra text accompanying
note 163-65.
116. Hovenkamp, supra note 57. For an extensive and critical discussion of
Hovenkamp's position, see also Korobkin (1994), supra note 21, at 679-82.
117. Hovenkamp, supra note 57, at 239.
118. However, one must also recognize that except for those few categories of
losses to which potential losers object as a matter of absolute principle, wealth
constraints generally affect people's asking prices as well as their offer prices
because they influence assessments of the urgency of alternative uses to which
any payments received in compensation for a loss could be applied. See
Korobkin (1994), supra note 21, at 679-82 (discussing and critiquing
Hovenkamp's argument extensively).
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criterion. One may well be critical on utilitarian or other grounds
of the use of the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency criterion that underlies
cost-benefit methodology. Many of the external critics of costbenefit analysis focus upon this feature. However, the offer/asking
price question addressed in this Article only arises if one first
takes the legitimacy of "willingness to pay" approach to valuation
as a given, and then attempts to most accurately implement that
general approach.
Hovenkamp's conclusion that asking prices are the
appropriate means of valuation of all impacts of a policy appears
to be driven primarily by his view that using asking prices to
measure all of its impacts would likely lead to evaluative results
that would more closely track the results of a utilitarian
calculation conducted without regard to wealth differentials than
would using offer prices to measure some or all of its impacts. It
may well be the case that the use of asking prices to measure all
impacts would better align the results of cost-benefit analyses with
utilitarian analyses, but Hovenkamp's approach appears
unjustified if the goal of these exercises is to accurately measure
"willingness to pay" and efficiency consequences without regard to
the consequences of the measure under consideration when viewed
from a utilitarian perspective.
In 1993, Elizabeth Hoffman and Matthew Spitzer published
an article which has since become widely known and cited for its
discussion of the empirical evidence strongly suggesting that the
divergence between offer and asking prices is pervasive,
sometimes quite substantial, and very context-specific in
magnitude.'19 In that article, they also reviewed some of the
explanations offered by other writers for this divergence, including
wealth effects, 2' prospect theory and the endowment effect, 12 1 the
desire to close transactions, 2' value uncertainty,"' and regret
theory."4 The authors briefly discussed the recommendations of
Jack Knetsch, Duncan Kennedy, and others with regard to
choosing between offer prices and asking prices in cost-benefit
analysis,"' but declined to offer a general valuation framework of
their own.
They instead concluded only that the available
evidence suggested the relationship between offer prices and
asking prices was a "far more complex pattern" than those prior
writers had recognized, but that this evidence also left "many of

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Hoffman and Spitzer, supra note 50, at 66-85.
Id. at 85-87.
Id. at 87-91.
Id. at 91-93.
Id. at 93-96.
Id. at 94-96.
Id. at 106-12.
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the details of this relationship unresolved."'26 They also concluded
that additional experimental evidence answering these remaining
questions was needed before any firm conclusions could be reached
regarding the appropriate valuation techniques to use in various
contexts.127
The most comprehensive and insightful analyses of the
offer/asking price conundrum to date have been the two articles on8
this topic written by Russell Korobkin almost a decade apart.'1
Because they are unfortunately not as well-known as the earlier
Kennedy and Hoffman and Spitzer articles, let me briefly
summarize and comment upon the main points Korobkin makes in
each of these articles.
In his initial 1994 article 129 Korobkin first articulated his
central argument that neither offer prices nor asking prices were
necessarily the most appropriate measure for valuing benefits or
costs under all circumstances, but that the appropriate valuation
measure in each instance depended on what factors gave rise to a
particular divergence between the two prices. 3 ° He began his
discussion by summarily rejecting the "winners bribe losers, taken
seriously" approach of Duncan Kennedy on the same baseline
indeterminacy and status quo bias grounds that Kennedy had
invoked to criticize that approach in his earlier article. 3' Korobkin
also briefly noted what he describes as the "traditional efficiency
analyst's" valuation approach.'
This simply utilizes offer prices
for valuing all costs and benefits, thereby avoiding any special
measurement difficulties that might be presented by the effort to
obtain asking prices for some impacts. 3
I fully agree with
Korobkin's forceful rejection of that latter approach as "utterly
and lacking
unconvincing, ". 4 "intellectually unsatisfying,"''
intellectual coherence,'36 because it only begs the question of which

126. Id. at 111.
127. Id. at 111-14.
128. Korobkin (1994), supra note 21; Korobkin (2003), supra note 48.
129. Korobkin (1994), supra note 21.
130. Id. at 666.
131. Id. at 675-76. See Kennedy, supra note 57, at 411-13 (asserting that
baseline problems make the winners-losers formula indeterminate).
132. Korobkin (1994), supra note 21, at 676.
133. Id. at 675-76.
134. Id. at 676.
135. Id. at 701.
136. Id. However, Korobkin concedes that this comparison of winners' offer
prices and losers' offer prices has some plausibility in the context of when a
new entitlement is being created that did not exist prior to the implementation
of the measure being considered. Id. at 676 n.63. Nevertheless, he is
unwilling to endorse the use of such an offer price comparison under
circumstances where a prior legal entitlement exists, but where it is unclear
whether it is the winners or the losers from a measure that currently hold that
entitlement. Id. at 701.
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measure better represents value. Korobkin then offers a much
more extensive critique of both Markovits' "winners' asking prices
and losers' offer prices" and Hovenkamp's "use all asking prices"
approaches as each being "incomplete and untenable," 7 both for
the reasons I alluded to earlier 3 ' and also because of their failure
to recognize that different factors can give rise to the divergence
between offer and asking prices. This latter fact is, in his opinion
crucial for determining which measure better reflects value in a
particular instance.'39
Korobkin references the empirical literature existing at that
time noting the pervasive and often substantial divergence
between offer and asking prices, " ' and then turns to identifying
the reasons for this divergence. He first claims that the "wealth
effect" increase in the valuation of an entitlement at issue when
measured by asking prices rather than offer prices is generally too
small to account for the empirically observed magnitude of the
divergence. "'
He also notes that attempts to measure asking
prices may, for various reasons, overestimate those valuations
more than do comparable attempts to measure offer prices."
However, he takes the position that asking prices often exceed
offer prices for reasons other than such wealth effects or
differential measurement errors, and then analyzes those other
reasons for this divergence.
Korobkin's article does not directly address the proper means
of valuation of the benefits of a measure; presumably he would
value those benefits at the winners' offer prices as would
Michelman, Knetsch, and Kennedy."
Instead, his analysis
focuses on the more difficult issues raised by attempts to value the
cost impacts of policies.

137. Id. at 666.
138. See supra text accompanying notes 68-77 (concerning the Markovits
proposal). See also supra text accompanying notes 116-19 (concerning the
Hovenkamp proposal).
139. Korobkin (1994), supra note 21, at 665-66, 676-79 (criticizing the
Markovits approach in some detail). See also id. at 679-82 (criticizing the
Hovenkamp approach in some detail).
140. Id. at 667-69.
141. Id. at 684-86.
142. Id. at 686-87. "Empirical studies... indicate that people might, on
average, overstate their WTA [asking price] more than they understate their
WTP [offer price]... . If these results of controlled experiments are applicable
in a wide variety of circumstances, they imply that in some cases WTA prices
represent true value less accurately than WTP prices." Id. at 687.
143. See supra text accompanying notes 62-68 (discussing the Michelman
approach); supra text accompanying notes 82-104 (discussing the Kennedy
approach); supra text accompanying notes 105-115 (discussing the Knetsch
approach). But see supra text accompanying 68-77 (discussing the Markovits
approach); supra text accompanying notes 116-19 (discussing the Hovenkamp
approach). Each utilizes asking prices to measure winners' gains.
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Korobkin's taxonomy of the factors that may underlie a
particular divergence between offer prices and asking prices is
obviously based on the 1993 work of Elizabeth Hoffman and
Matthew Spitzer, and on the work of the other writers to whom
Hoffman and Spitzer had cited in their article. Nevertheless,
Korobkin's view represents an important advance in that it
organizes those disparate insights into a manageable factor list.
He uses the terms "loss aversion"'" and "endowment effect"
interchangeably to describe the pervasive divergence between offer
prices and asking prices for losses that exceeds what can be
explained by mere wealth effects or differential measurement
errors.145 Korobkin then attempts to unpack this phenomena by
defining " 6 a group of various additional factors that may give rise
to this divergence. One of those factors he labels the "attachment
effect;" the increased value people ascribe to something once they
have learned how to enjoy it. "7 A second factor he identifies as the
"dignity effect," which is the reluctance people may feel for
cultural reasons to relinquish those entitlements in exchange for a
cash payment. " 8 A third factor, which he labels the "left alone
effect," 4' is grounded in a "psychic aversion to bargaining""' and in
the desire to definitively close transactions and thus avoid the
need for further consideration of transactional possibilities."'
Finally, he calls the fourth factor the "regret effect,"" 2 which is the
fear a person may have that if he sells an entitlement he may later
come to regret the transaction."'
144. The term "loss aversion" describing the fact that asking prices may
exceed offer prices even absent wealth effects was coined by Amos Twersky
and Daniel Kahneman. See generally Amos Twersky & Daniel Kahneman,
Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-Dependent Model, 106 Q.J.
ECON. 1039 (1991).
145. Korobkin (1994), supra note 21, at 688.
146. Korobkin modestly does not claim that this preliminary analysis is
definitive or exhaustive. "Much work remains to be done to develop a more
complete understanding of when different factors cause the offer/asking price
gap." Id. at 684 n.98.
147. Id. at 689.
148. Id. at 691-95. Korobkin illustrates this "dignity effect" by noting the
widespread reluctance to provide sex in exchange for financial compensation,
and also notes the existence of a widespread perception that one has a higher
duty to act altruistically when one owns an entitlement whose relinquishment
would injure another person than one does to purchase that entitlement to
protect another person. Id. at 691-92.
149. Id. at 695-96.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 696-97.
153. See id. at 696 (recognizing that such "fear of regret" could also be
impounded in offer prices because persons may fear regretting a purchase, but
claims that this fear "could, logically, affect WTA [asking prices] more than
WTP [offer prices]"). However, the fact that the regret effect "could, logically"
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For Korobkin's purposes, the most important aspect of this
taxonomy is that of the divergence between offer prices and asking
prices that exceeds the amount that can be credibly explained by
the wealth effect or by possible differential measurement errors,
only the proportion of this divergence that stems from the
attachment effect reflects a disutility that necessarily follows from
the imposition of a loss. The disutilities generated by the dignity
effect, the left alone effect, and the regret effect are each only
associated with a policy that involves the loser selling an
entitlement or other benefit rather than a coerced transfer of that
entitlement or benefit." Most cost-benefit analyses are conducted
with regard to policies which, if implemented, will impose costs on
the losers without the payment of compensation based upon their
asking prices (if compensatory payments are to be made at all).
Korobkin's central point is that such mandated losses should not
be regarded as "sales" on the part of the losers. Therefore, those
proportions of the differentials between asking prices and offer
prices that are derived from the losers' assessment of the severity
of these various sale-related disutilities should not properly be
included as part of the valuation of a loss that will not in fact be
accompanied by asking price-based compensation payments.
As discussed more fully below, however, a complementary
argument can also be made that for such coercively imposed losses
these downward adjustments of asking prices called for by
Korobkin should also be accompanied by partially, or perhaps
wholly, offsetting upward adjustments to reflect those special
disutilities associated with being subjected to the "indignity of a
forced taking" that are not captured by asking price measures
determined with reference to a hypothetical consensual
transaction.'
Korobkin unfortunately overlooks this corollary
adjustment that appears to be necessary to complete his method of
adjusting asking prices in order to accurately reflect the actual
disutilities borne by the losers because of losses resulting from
coercive, uncompensated implementation of a policy.
Despite this minor omission, Korobkin's analysis makes a
unique and important contribution to the enterprise of valuing
losses in cost-benefit analyses. He offers a compelling argument:
when an observed divergence between offer prices and asking
prices for a loss results solely from the wealth effect and/or the
attachment effect, then asking prices are "the most accurate

affect asking prices more than it does offer prices obviously does not mean that
it does so in any particular instance. Korobkin later offers a more complete
justification for assuming that the regret effect has a larger impact upon
asking prices than upon offer prices. Korobkin (2003), supra note 48, at 1254-

55.
154. Korobkin (1994), supra note 21, at 696-97.

155. I am indebted to Richard Parker for this insight.
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measure of value."'56 Conversely, if the divergence is a result
solely of the dignity effect, the left alone effect, and/or the regret
effect, then those losses could be accurately valued by the losers'
offer prices if the analysis is being conducted of a typical
manditorily-imposed measure
not including asking-price based
15 7
compensation payments.
Korobkin concedes that his analysis is incomplete in some
regards.'58 Firstly, it is not clear whether he embraces the use of
asking prices to value losses in all instances where offer prices and
asking price measures of costs diverge solely because of the wealth
effects created by posing the asking price question and not because
of any of the other factors he notes may at times contribute to the
divergence. It is possible that, despite his conclusion that under
those circumstances asking prices provide "the most accurate
measure of value,"'59 he might on other grounds nevertheless favor
the use of asking prices only for the subset of those losses
reflecting a loss of legal entitlements, similar to Kennedy's "no
transaction costs, taken seriously" approach, and not for other
losses not protected by legal entitlements. He might alternatively
favor some more complex approach to valuing costs that also takes
into account the extent of expectations of legal and/or social norm
protection, as Knetsch suggests." Korobkin does not elaborate his
position here in sufficient detail to be certain of his views.
Secondly, and more significantly, while Korobkin does
advance plausible valuation recommendations for the two polar
cases where all of the divergence between offer and asking prices
stem from either the attachment and wealth effects alone, or from
the combination of the dignity effect, left alone effect, or regret
effect alone, he unfortunately does not clarify whether offer or
asking prices should be used to value losses in the more general
case where the divergence stems from all five of these factors. This
may in fact be the most commonly recurring situation facing costbenefit analysts."' To his credit, however, Korobkin recognizes
that an observed divergence between the offer and asking price

156. Korobkin (1994), supra note 21, at 697.
157. Id. at 696-97. This latter claim is incomplete to the extent it does not
adjust offer prices upwards as necessary to include the value of the indignity
of a forced taking. See supra text accompanying notes 155-56 (proclaiming the
importance of adjusting offer prices upwards).
158. Korobkin (1994), supra note 21, at 707 ("The causes of the offer/asking
gap are numerous.. . this compilation is far from exhaustive.").
159. Id. at 697.
160. See supra text accompanying notes 109-13 (favoring increased
complexity in valuing costs).
161. See Korobkin (1994), supra note 21, at 689 (taking the position that
when the wealth effect or measurement error is what is causing an
offer/asking price divergence "policymakers can select relatively easily which
measure most closely approximates the subjects' true value ...).
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valuations of a cost impact may stem from all five of the effects
that he describes, and that this may call for utilizing some
weighted average of offer and asking prices for valuation 61 (though
he does not elaborate on how these weights might be
determined"Y).
Finally, as noted above, Korobkin does not incorporate an
indignity from forced taking effects-based upwards adjustment of
asking prices into his framework for policies that coercively impose
uncompensated losses, even though such an adjustment would
seem to be appropriate as a necessary complement to the
downward adjustments he advocates to reflect the absence of
particular disutilities associated only with consensual sale
transactions.
The overall approach suggested by Korobkin in his 1994
article is very insightful in its identification of the various factors
that may explain a particular divergence between offer and asking
prices.
However, even if one accepts all of his theoretical
arguments, this approach is likely far too demanding in its data
requirements to be feasible for conducting real-world cost-benefit
analyses, given the severe data limitations often present with
regard to asking prices. For each of the observed divergences
between offer prices and asking prices for a particular class of cost
impacts, an analyst following this approach would have to first
identify the relative contributions of each of the five factors
described by Korobkin with regard to that divergence. Then, for
those instances in which a number of these factors were present,
the analyst would have to determine whether, given that
particular mix of factors present and their relative contributions,
the appropriate valuation method was offer prices, asking prices,
or some particular weighted combination of the two that would
itself have to be justified in some way. Finally, the requisite
disutility from forced taking effects adjustments would have to be
made to those valuations. A very tall order, indeed!
In his 2003 article," Korobkin discusses a number of other
legal issues, but also revisits the offer/asking price question. In
this article, he consistently refers to the divergence between offer
and asking prices as the "endowment effect," and again sets forth
the various factors he believes give rise to this divergence. He also
makes some modest revisions to his earlier classificatory scheme.
In particular, he decomposes the single factor he described in his
earlier article as the "attachment effect" into two separate factors:
M

162. Id. at 708.
163. See id. (failing to discuss whether or how this weighted average would
be further adjusted to reflect the relative significance of wealth effects on the
divergence between offer and asking prices as compared to the overall impact
of the four noted effects).
164. Korobkin (2003), supra note 48.
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the "pure loss aversion effect" generally resulting from the
"negative emotions associated with the abstract concept of loss,"
and the loss-specific "attachment effect" stemming from specific
emotional attachments people form with regard to particular
benefits they enjoy."' He then combines the two factors that he
earlier described separately as the "dignity effect" and the "left
along effect" into a single factor which he now labels "disutility
caused by selling."6 '
Korobkin reaffirms his earlier argument that, in instances
where the divergence between the two measures of "willingness to
pay" can be explained solely by the regret effect and/or by the
disutility from sale effect, offer prices provide an accurate measure
of value with regard to proposals that will not actually involve
asking price-based compensation payments.'67 Once again, he does
not address the possibility of applying a comparable upward
adjustment to reflect the indignity of a forced taking effect. He
also reaffirms his position that where the divergence is caused
solely by the combination of pure loss aversion, the attachment
effect, and the wealth effect, then unadjusted asking prices are the
appropriate measure of valuation." However, he now qualifies to
some extent this endorsement of the use of asking prices under
those circumstances by expressing a Kennedy-like concern for the
strong status quo-bias inherent in the use of the combination of
offer price measures of gains and asking price measure of cost
impacts." 9 He further qualifies his methodology by endorsing the
prices if asking price
use of offer price valuations instead of asking
70
measures of valuation are "illegitimate."1
This latter legitimacy qualification is not further elaborated
on, but is potentially significant for valuation purposes in that it
would inject a large dose of indeterminacy into cost-benefit
analysis unless clear and widely-accepted criteria were developed
for determining when a person's disutility stemming from their
loss aversion attitudes and feelings of attachment to a currently
enjoyed benefit qualifies as legitimate so that asking price
valuations may be appropriate. Korobkin also fails to further
develop his preliminary comments in his 1994 article regarding
how his approach is to be applied in instances where a number of
different factors underlie the offer/asking price divergence, nor
165. Id. at 1250-52.
166. Id. at 1252-54.
167. Id. at 1258.
168. "[I]f the status quo is a commodity for which people have an innate
preference , it is difficult to argue that efficiency-minded lawmakers should
not take this preference into account, just like any other preference." Id. at
1264.
169. See id. (arguing that this conclusion "threatens to render public policy
extremely conservative and opposed to change.")
170. Id.
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does he address the feasibility of applying his approach in light of
the severe data limitations commonly facing cost-benefit analysts.
Korobkin's work represents the culmination of the academic
commentary on this question to date. Let me now turn to the
contributions that the OMB has made through the guidance it
periodically provides to federal agencies who must submit costbenefit analyses of their proposed regulations for OIRA approval
pursuant to Executive Order 12866.171
While the various positions taken by the OMB over the years
with regard to the offer/asking price question have not been
supported by explicit rationales comparable either in extent or
sophistication to those offered by the academic commentators
discussed above, the OMB's statements are nevertheless highly
significant as a practical matter since OIRA most often serves as
the final arbitrator as to the adequacy of these analyses. I will
therefore describe and briefly discuss the evolving position that
the OMB has taken on this valuation question in recent years.
In 1992, the OMB first issued a rudimentary set of guidelines
172
for federal agencies to follow in conducting cost-benefit analyses.
Those guidelines embraced the "willingness-to-pay" economic
efficiency framework for valuing benefits and costs, 173 but did not
specifically address the issues of the appropriate choice of a
valuation baseline, or whether offer prices or asking prices were
the more appropriate measures of a policy's benefits and costs.
In 1996 the OMB issued a more comprehensive "best
practices" document that addressed a number of issues presented
by cost-benefit analyses of proposed regulations.
That document
in clear terms declared that the baseline for valuation should be
the pre-policy status quo distribution of entitlements and other
benefits enjoyed,'75 making no reference to Kennedy's arguments
that this is an arbitrary baseline choice.' 76 The OMB document
also embraced valuing benefits and costs in accordance with
"willingness to pay."77 With regard to valuing benefits, the OMB
171. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, at 51,740 (Sept. 30, 1993).
172. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, GUIDELINES AND DISCOUNT RATES FOR

BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL PROGRAMS, Circular No. A-94 (Revised)

(1992)
[hereinafter
OMB
(1992)],
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/a094/a094.html (last visited on Nov.

30, 2005).
173. Id. at 6, 19.
174. See OMB (1996), supra note 31 (convening an "interagency group" to
describe "best practices").
175. See id. ("The benefits and costs of each alternative must be measured
against a baseline," which "should be the best assessment of the way the world
would look absent the proposed regulation.").
176. See Kennedy, supra note 57, at 413-14 (cautioning that non-arbitrary
meanings may lend to political posturing).
177. "The concept of 'opportunity cost' is the appropriate construct for
valuing both benefits and costs. The principle of 'willingness to pay' captures
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further stated that: "Either willingness-to-pay (WTP) or
willingness-to-accept (WTA) can provide an appropriate measure
of benefits, depending on the allocation of property rights. The
common preference for WTP over WTA measures is based on the
empirical difficulties in estimating the latter."1 8
This statement is somewhat opaque, to say the least. The
academic commentators mentioned above that treated the
allocation of property rights as significant in some way for
valuation purposes did so with regard to valuing the costs imposed
by a measure, not the benefits conferred. The "best practices"
document unfortunately does not explain why the OMB views the
allocation of property rights as also relevant for benefit valuation
purposes. The OMB also does not explain whether, by using this
phrase, it is referring to the pre- or post-policy implementation
allocation of property rights, nor what the appropriate relationship
is between a particular allocation of property rights and the
method of valuation that should be selected.
In contrast,
Markovits and Hovenkamp each argued for the use of asking price
measures for benefits each in sweeping, unqualified terms'79
without regard to the allocation of property rights that preceded or
would result from a particular policy.
Moreover, it is not clear whether the OMB's recognition that
offer prices are often utilized to measure benefits rather than
asking prices because of the empirical difficulties in measuring
asking prices is simply a descriptive claim regarding current
practice, or is also intended to be an endorsement of that practice.
The latter position would be contrary to Korobkin's summary
rejection of that rationale for the use of offer prices."
Perhaps
instead it is intended to be an implicit criticism of using offer
prices for evaluating benefits without somehow grounding their
use in the particular allocation of property rights present in a
particular instance. With regard to valuing costs, the 1996 "best
practices" document once again implicitly embraces the general
"willingness-to-pay" measurement framework but does not address
when offer prices and when asking prices should be utilized. This
is a crucial and somewhat surprising omission in what is a fairly
lengthy and otherwise relatively comprehensive document.
In 2000, the OMB issued an updated set of guidelines for
measuring benefits and costs.'81 That document again reaffirmed

the notion of opportunity cost[s]." OMB (1996), supra note 31.
178. Id.
179. See supra text accompanying notes 68-75 (condemning the conventional
approach because it is grounded in faulty assumptions); supra text
accompanying notes 116-19 (discussing the theories of Hovenkamp).
180. See supra text accompanying notes 132-36 (conceding the comparison's

legitimacy, but not backing it completely).
181. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, GUIDELINES TO STANDARDIZE MEASURES
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the use of the existing status quo as the valuation baseline'82 and
1
the use of the "willingness-to-pay" general valuation framework.
However, these new guidelines surprisingly did not address the
offer/asking price question at all, neither for valuing benefits nor
valuing costs.
In 2003, the OMB promulgated additional guidelines for
conducting cost-benefit analyses."'
Once again, the OMB
reaffirmed the use of the status quo as the valuation baseline.'9
In these new guidelines, however, the OMB also addressed the
offer/asking price question at greater length than it had in 1996:
"Opportunity cost" is the appropriate concept for valuing both
benefits and costs. The principle of "willingness-to-pay" (WTP)
captures the notion of opportunity cost by measuring what
individuals are willing to forgo to enjoy a particular benefit. In
general, economists tend to view WTP as the most appropriate
measure of opportunity cost, but an individual's "willingness-toaccept" (WTA) compensation for not receiving the improvement can
also provide a valid measure of opportunity cost. WTP and WTA are
comparable measures when the change being evaluated is small and
especially where there are reasonably close substitutes available.
WTP is generally considered to be more readily measurable and to
provide a more conservative measure of benefits. Adoption of WTP
as the measure of value implies that individual preferences of the
affected population should be a guiding factor in the regulatory
decision and that the existing distribution of income is acceptable.'6
The latest OMB pronouncement quoted above is quite
interesting and merits sentence-by-sentence parsing. Initially, the
OMB again endorses the "willingness to pay" general valuation
framework for cost-benefit analyses. However, it then takes a very
different approach than the 1996 "best practices" document. It
nowhere claims that the appropriate choice between the use of
offer prices or asking prices to measure benefits depends on the
allocation of property rights. Rather, it states much more
ambivalently that while economists "tend to view" offer prices as
the appropriate measure, asking prices "can also provide a valid
measure" of benefits. No explanation of when asking prices are an
appropriate alternative measure is given, perhaps suggesting that
the OMB regards the use of asking prices as an acceptable

OF COSTS AND BENEFITS AND THE FORMAT OF AcCOUNTING STATEMENTS

(2000)
[hereinafter
OMB
(2000)],
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/memoranda/m00-08.pdf.
182. Id. at 1.
183. Id. at 9.
184. OMB Draft Guidelines for the Conduct of Regulatory Analysis and the
Format of Accounting Statements, 68 Fed. Reg. at 5,513.
185. Id. at 5,517.
186. Id. at 5,518.
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alternative valuation approach for benefits in all instances. 8'7 If
so, given the consistent (though only implicit) rejection of
Kennedy's "the baseline is arbitrary" position contained in all of
the OMB's pronouncements, this new language suggests the OMB
may now be implicitly embracing either of the dubious Markovits
or Hovenkamp rationales for valuing benefits through asking
prices, although no supporting justification is presented that
would make their views here more clear.
One portion of the quote above declares that offer and asking
prices are "comparable measures" - presumably meaning that any
differences in magnitude are slight in both absolute and relative
terms - for policies with small impacts and where reasonably close
substitutes exist for the benefits or costs at issue. This statement
is much too broad. As Korobkin makes clear, offer and asking
prices can diverge significantly for any of a number of reasons,
even in instances where the effects of the measure under
consideration are small enough so that the wealth effect associated
with asking price measures is insignificant. The existence of close
substitutes might well reduce the significance of the attachment
effect, but would not necessarily reduce the magnitude of the pure
loss aversion effect, the disutility from sale, or regret effects in
instances where they are present, nor would have a necessary
relationship to the size of the indignity from a forced taking effect.
Other things being equal, it is plausible that the smaller cost or
benefit impacts of a measure which occur in contexts where close
substitutes exist is likely to result in smaller absolute divergences
However, this will not
between offer and asking prices.
necessarily result in smaller relative divergences, and these
divergences would be unpredictable in size and may still be
collectively large enough to significantly affect the outcome of an
analysis.
Finally, the last two sentences of the quote make one wonder
as to whether the OMB truly understands what is at issue in the
choice between offer or asking prices as a valuation approach, or
whether it is perhaps deliberately being evasive on the question.
As the OMB states, offer prices are often more easily measurable
than asking prices" and consistently provide a "more conservative
measure of benefits" or, for that matter, of costs as well. However,
if asking prices are the most accurate valuation measure for a

187. The new guidelines, however, cryptically state in another passage that
"[ilf the property... rights in the policy context support the use of...
willingness-to-pay (WTP) measures...", suggesting that the OMB may still be

of the view that the allocation of property rights is somehow relevant to the
choice between offer price or asking price measures of benefits, although it is
again unclear whether it is the pre-policy or post-policy allocation of property
rights that is deemed to be significant. Id. at 5,520.
188. OMB (1996), supra note 31, at 22.
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particular policy impact, an analyst would not necessarily be
justified in using a less accurate measurement approach simply
because it is easier to apply. It would of course be even easier to
arbitrarily make up valuation numbers out of whole cloth, but this
obviously would be an unacceptable approach! Similarly, just
because a measure results in conservatively low valuations of
benefits or costs, it does not justify its use over a measure that
may give larger but more accurate valuations. The goal in costbenefit analysis is neither to obtain the smallest possible valuation
numbers for benefits or costs, nor to necessarily utilize the easiest
to apply measurement approach regardless of its lack of accuracy,
but rather to obtain the most accurate assessment of efficiency
consequences reasonably possible given the constraints imposed by
the available data.
Finally, the last sentence quoted above simply begs the
question. The use of offer prices to value benefits and costs
recognizes that individual preferences are the "guiding factor" and
that the existing distribution of income is taken as a given in costbenefit analysis. But the use of asking prices for valuations is also
based upon those same two premises. The unaddressed issue is
whether offer prices or asking prices more accurately measure the
"willingness to pay" that results from those preferences and the
initial wealth distribution.
Having summarized and briefly discussed the contributions
that various scholars and the most involved governmental agency
have made to the resolution of the offer/asking price conundrum,
let me now offer my contributions to this inquiry.
2. An Improved Framework for Valuing Willingness to Pay
Building upon the work of the various writers discussed
above, I propose in this sub-section a general framework for
determining when to use offer prices and when to use asking
prices in determining "willingness to pay" for the purpose of
conducting cost-benefit analyses.
a.

Choice of Premises

In my view, Duncan Kennedy is correct in asserting that
there is no clear answer to the offer/asking price valuation
question inherent in the concepts of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency and
"willingness to pay."'89
The optimal valuation approach is
obviously dependent upon the purposes which the cost-benefit
analysis is intended to serve. For some purposes, use of the often
significantly larger asking price measurements of "willingness to
pay" for all policy consequences will be more effective. For other
purposes, offer price measures of all impacts will serve better, and
189. See supra text accompanying notes 86-88.

2006]

The AppropriateMeasure of Willingness to Pay

or still other purposes, offer price measures of some impacts and
asking price measures of other impacts could prove most useful.
It is thus necessary that I clarify the assumptions regarding
the
purpose
of cost-benefit
analysis
underlying
my
recommendations. My suggested valuation approach is explicitly
based upon the premise that the proper goal of the cost-benefit
analyst is simply to accurately measure the Kaldor-Hicks
efficiency consequences of the measure in question.
My
recommendations will not be formulated to address in any way the
threshold incommensurability problem that calls the entire
framework of cost-benefit analysis into some question. Nor will I
embrace a position regarding the wisdom of basing the valuation
of the consequences of a policy on numbers derived from the
existing distribution of wealth and entitlements, the legitimacy of
ignoring distributional impacts, or the legitimacy of abstaining
from consideration of the merits of a policy from utilitarian,
philosophical, or religious perspectives that do not embrace the
Kaldor-Hicks evaluative criterion.
While such broader
considerations are legitimate aspects of an inclusive overall
decision-making process, I will assume for purposes of this Article
that those considerations will be taken into account elsewhere in
that process and that the appropriate role of cost-benefit analysis
is simply to modestly evaluate efficiency consequences as a
contribution to that decision-making process. My objective is
solely to provide assistance for choosing between the use of offer
price and asking price measures of the "willingness to pay" for
costs or benefits in making that relatively restricted assessment.
b.

Choice of the Baseline

My opinion is that the appropriate baseline from which to
value the benefits and costs of a policy is the existing status quo
prior to its implementation. Duncan Kennedy has argued that
this is an entirely arbitrary baseline choice; that for a particular
proposal one could just as reasonably choose the postimplementation state of affairs as the baseline for valuation and
then evaluate the proposed restoration of the original status quo
as being the actual policy under consideration." Kennedy argues
that an analyst is thus free to first do a "hypothetical reversal" of
the entitlement baseline before engaging in a cost-benefit analysis,
potentially rendering the efficiency conclusions of that analysis
indeterminate if the valuations of the effects considered are
significantly altered by that change in the baseline.
I disagree, however, and do not believe that such a
hypothetical reversal is a reasonable option. The use of the status
quo as a baseline for valuing proposed changes has a rather
190. See supra text accompanying notes 94-96.
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obvious special claim to legitimacy and practical usefulness that
the use of the hypothetical post-policy implementation distribution
of entitlements and other benefits does not. It is changes in the
status quo that are invariably under consideration in practical
policy deliberations, not whether the state should act to enforce
the law and reverse the effects of unauthorized infringements,
thereby restoring the initial entitlements and other benefits to the
adversely affected persons.
I therefore recommend that all
impacts of a proposal should be characterized as either benefits or
costs relative to the baseline of the status quo existing prior to the
proposal's implementation. I note that the OMB has consistently
been in full accord with my position.
c.

Valuing the Benefits of a Policy

My viewpoint is that the benefits of a measure should be
valued at the offer prices of the persons receiving those benefits,
whether or not those benefits will be accompanied by the
conferring of a legal entitlement to their continuation. Most of the
writers that I have discussed have also embraced this position,
either explicitly or implicitly. Whether one embraces either the
"no transaction costs, taken seriously" valuation approach, or the
"winners bribe losers taken seriously" approach, offer prices are
the appropriate measure of the "willingness to pay" for benefits.
I recognize that Richard Markovits and Herbert Hovenkamp
have each instead argued for the use of asking prices to measure
benefits. 9' As I have discussed, however, neither of their proposed
approaches are convincing as to why asking prices are the
appropriate measures of benefits, 9 ' and neither of these writers
have received any support from any other scholars of which I am
aware for their recommendations. I also recognize that the OMB
at one point limited its endorsement of offer prices as a means of
valuing benefits to those situations where this practice is justified
by the particular "allocation of property rights." Although it did
not elaborate on what was meant by this very broad phrase or why
it took that position, the OMB later went further in qualifying the
use of offer price valuations for benefits when it broadly claimed
that asking prices "can also provide a valid measure" 9 ' of benefits.
Again, it unfortunately did not elaborate concerning under what
circumstances asking price measures would have validity. The
OMB has never subsequently offered any sufficient justification
for limiting the use of offer prices to value benefits in any of its
publications. I also therefore reject the ambivalent OMB approach

191. Markovits (1975), supra note 57; Hovenkamp, supra note 57.
192. See supra text accompanying notes 73-78 and 119-20.
193. See supra text accompanying note 186.
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and call for the use of offer prices to value all benefits in
conducting cost-benefit analyses.
d.

Valuing the Costs of a Policy

In my view, the most difficult issue presented by the
offer/asking price conundrum is the question of valuing the costs
imposed by a measure. As discussed, the above commentators
have taken a wide range of conflicting positions on this matter. A
number of these writers have offered a sweeping recommendation
calling for the use of asking prices to value all cost impacts. In
sharp contrast, however, Richard Markovits called for the use of
offer prices to value all cost impacts' and the OMB has suggested
that use of offer prices to value costs is a valid, though not
necessarily required, approach.' 9' Still other writers have drawn
distinctions for valuation purposes regarding whether the person
bearing a cost has a legal entitlement to not have that cost
imposed,' or whether that person has at least some expectation of
enforcement of a legal entitlement,'97 or which underlying factors
triggered the divergence between offer prices and asking prices
with regard to that cost impact.'9 8
I will address this complicated question separately for
different categories of cost impacts, depending upon the losers'
legal entitlement status. In those instances where those persons
who would be losers from a proposal have a legal entitlement that
would be contravened if the proposal is implemented, I generally
favor the use of asking prices as the valuation measure. Most, but
not all, the commentators agree with this general proposition. I
will briefly discuss each of the four most prominent criticisms of
this stance.
Richard Markovits flatly rejects this conclusion and calls for
offer price measures of all cost impacts.'
Jack Knetsch accepts
the use of asking price measures to value such cost impacts that
abridge legal entitlements, but only under those circumstances
where the nature of the legal entitlement is full property rule
protection rather than the more limited liability rule protection.0 °
The OMB now accepts asking prices as among the "valid
measures" of cost impacts, but exhibits a less than wholehearted
endorsement of using asking price valuations under these legal
entitlement circumstances as well as in other situations.'0 '
194.
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Finally, Russell Korobkin only agrees with using asking price
measures for such losses to the extent that the divergence between
offer prices and asking prices stems from factors
other than the
20 2
disutility from selling effect or the regret effect.
The critical views of these first two commentators can be
dismissed rather summarily. Markovits' position is completely
untenable and can be easily rejected for the reasons previously
discussed. 22' Knetsch's position also appears unjustified. Both full
property rule protection and the more limited liability rule
protection of entitlements are each still legal protection against an
uncompensated taking, and such protection is something for which
a person would have to be compensated to part with under either
the "no transaction costs, taken seriously" or the "winners bribe
losers, taken seriously" approach. If only liability rule protection
is available for an entitlement, that fact will presumably be
reflected in a lower asking price. However, that asking price would
still generally exceed the offer price for that entitlement for the
reasons discussed in the two Korobkin articles. I therefore do not
believe that any distinctions should be made between property
rule-protected and liability rule-protected entitlements for cost
impact valuation purposes.
Even if true, the claims made by the OMB that offer prices
are often easier to measure and produce smaller numbers than
asking prices simply do not provide a convincing rationale for
using offer prices to value such costs. If asking prices are the
theoretically appropriate measure of "willingness to pay" for cost
impacts, then the justification of offer prices in those instances
would also have to show that the difference between the two
valuation measures is always too insignificant in magnitude to
affect the conclusions of the analysis, or at least that a fairly
stable mathematical relationship exists between offer prices and
asking prices so that offer price measurements could be
appropriately scaled upward to provide accurate estimates of what
is sought to be measured. However, no such showings have been
made.
Moreover, the available evidence suggests that the
presence and magnitude of the divergence between offer prices and
asking prices is unpredictable and at times is quite large, as well
as very context-specific. If a theoretical analysis indicates that
asking price valuation measures are appropriate, the substitution
of offer price proxy measures that have a variable and potentially
large downward bias simply is not a credible valuation approach
in instances where there may be a significant divergence between
the two valuation measures which could affect the conclusions
reached, even if measurement difficulties are thereby reduced.

202. See supra text accompanying notes 154-57.
203. See supra text accompanying notes 73-78.
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Korobkin's argument that a deeper inquiry is necessary into
the sources of the divergence between offer and asking prices for
particular cost impacts of a policy before a valuation approach is
chosen is far more telling and merits extended consideration. His
insights
unfortunately
present
serious
and
possibly
insurmountable difficulties for cost-benefit analysts, and I will do
my best to address his concerns.
My conclusion is that the practical difficulties that would be
presented by the adjustments he recommends, and by the related
indignity from forced taking effect adjustments that he overlooks,
are overwhelming. As a "second best" solution, unadjusted asking
prices should be used to value the cost impacts associated with a
policy that contravenes legal entitlements.
One would expect that losses contravening clear legal
entitlements would tend to generate particularly strong
attachment effects on the part of the losers contributing heavily to
the divergence between offer and asking prices for those cost
impacts. Furthermore, when they are combined with any pure loss
aversion and wealth effects that are also present, these effects
together would often significantly dwarf the combined impact of
the more subtle disutility from selling and regret effects. Where
this is the case, the use of unadjusted asking prices for valuation
of the costs imposed would have a solid justification as a
reasonable approximation under the Korobkin framework, even for
those policies that do not incorporate asking price-based
compensation payments and, thus, do not impose any disutility
from selling or regret effects upon the losers that would be
reflected in their asking prices. However, this may not always be
the case.
The relative contribution of the losers' perceived
disutility from selling an entitlement to the divergence between
their offer and asking price magnitude is unpredictable, and could
obviously be very large or even infinite in those instances where
giving consent to the imposition of the costs was regarded by some
losers as contravening important cultural values or moral
principles. Under these circumstances, the measurement errors
that would be introduced by utilizing unadjusted asking prices to
value the cost impacts of a policy that are coercively imposed
rather than consensually purchased from the losers could then be
very large and even determinative of the overall efficiency
conclusions."0
Korobkin is correct in asserting that, as a matter of theory,
some form of downward adjustment that separates out that
proportion of the divergence between offer and asking prices for
such cost impacts that is due to the losers' perceived disutility

204. Those measurement errors, however, may in some cases be partially or
wholly offset by the adjustment for the indignity from forced taking effect.
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from selling would appear be necessary for accurate measurement
of "willingness to pay," at least for those policies under which
losses are coercively imposed rather than purchased. There may
also be instances where the regret effect makes a relatively large
contribution to the divergence, and where a similar downward
adjustment would therefore be appropriate, although admittedly I
do not have a very clear idea under what circumstances this would
be likely to occur, nor how to ascertain the size of the requisite
adjustment. As I have discussed, in those instances where such
downward adjustments were made to the asking price
measurements, there should also be made comparable upward
adjustments to reflect the indignity from forced taking effects not
incorporated in the asking price measures that are calculated in
contemplation of hypothetical compensated transactions. These
last adjustments would partially, or perhaps in some instances
even wholly or more than wholly, offset those prior downward
adjustments.
As discussed, Korobkin largely limits himself to analyzing the
two polar cases where either all or none of the divergence between
offer and asking prices is due to the combined disutility from
selling and regret effects. 5 He unfortunately does not address in
detail how his approach would be applied under more general
circumstances where all of the factors identified simultaneously
contribute to generating the divergence.2" However, in his 1994
article he briefly suggests the possibility of using a weighted
average of offer and asking prices to value costs where all of the
factors that might give rise to a divergence between those
measures are so commingled.0 7
This weighted approach average is conceptually sensible, with
the appropriate weights clearly being the relative proportions of
the divergence that can be attributed to each of the five major
factors Korobkin identifies in his 2003 article: the wealth effect,
the pure loss aversion effect, the attachment effect, the disutility
from selling effect, and the regret effect. To implement such an
approach in an actual cost-benefit analysis, however, one would
have to engage in a truly Herculean effort of factor analysis with
regard to each different category of significant costs imposed by a
policy, with this entire analytical effort resting upon the shaky
empirical foundations of often problematic asking price
measurements.
One would then somehow make further
adjustments for the indignity from forced taking effects. In my
opinion, this factor analysis framework is a theoretically wellgrounded approach for properly adjusting asking price measures of

205. See supra text accompanying notes 161-64.
206. See supra text accompanying notes 162-63.
207. Id.
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the costs imposed by a policy that infringes upon prior legal
entitlements.
It makes it abundantly clear that any proxy
measures utilized to make portions of such an analysis more
tractable, such as the use of more easily obtained offer prices to
value particular cost impacts, must be justified by showing that
those proxy measures will correspond closely to this theoretically
ideal adjusted asking price. This is the only way for the analysis
to serve its purpose in sufficiently and accurately assessing
efficiency consequences. However, it is difficult to envision a
situation where an analyst would have adequate data available to
actually be able to conduct such a factor analysis and make
reasonable estimates of the proportions of the divergence between
offer prices and asking prices for each particular category of cost
impacts that were attributable to the disutility from selling or
regret effects, not to mention the appropriate upward adjustments
to reflect the disutility from forced taking effects.
Given this practical limitation and that these adjustments to
asking prices would to some extent act in an offsetting fashion, I
favor as an accommodation to this data constraint that unadjusted
asking prices be used to measure those cost impacts that are
accompanied by the infringement of legal entitlements.
I
recognize that the size of the theoretically appropriate upward
adjustments to asking prices in order to reflect the disutility from
forced taking effects generally will not exactly offset the
comparable downward adjustments to asking prices that are
appropriate to incorporate the disutility from sale and regret
effects. In addition, the use of unadjusted asking prices which
abstract from those adjustments may thus introduce an additional
source of potential error into cost-benefit analyses. However, that
potential source of error is likely far smaller than is the systematic
and at times very large underestimation of costs that now results
from the widespread use in cost-benefit analysis of unadjusted
offer prices to measure cost impacts.
The real issue facing researchers is not whether to depart
from theoretically ideal, comprehensive, and precise analytical
frameworks as a concession to practical data availability
limitations, but how far to go in doing so. My recommendation
that several rather subtle and partially offsetting factors be
ignored in valuing cost impacts is a relatively minor concession to
data availability limitations and is therefore, in my opinion, a
defensible practice. In contrast, the sweeping use of offer prices as
a proxy for asking price measurements of costs is not a defensible
practice given the systematic and sometimes very large downward
bias thereby introduced into the efficiency assessment.
Ultimately, it is all a matter of degree.
An even more difficult question is posed by the valuation of
losses not protected by legal entitlements, but where the losers
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may nevertheless have a perception of some possible legal
protection from infringement. The same problem arises when they
believe that some informal social norms will, as a practical matter,
offer a degree of protection against appropriation of the benefits
they currently enjoy. Under the "no transaction costs, taken
seriously" approach, asking price measures would not be
appropriate unless that perception of entitlement is accurate, since
inaccurate perceptions confer no leverage in the hypothetical fully
informed bargaining negotiations. 2' However, under the "winners
bribe losers, taken seriously" approach, it would be appropriate to
value those losses at the losers' asking prices despite the
problematic character of their entitlement perceptions.
This
would be subject to Korobkin's adjustments where he argues that
asking prices should not be utilized to the extent that the
divergence between offer and asking prices is attributable to
disutility from selling and regret effects.
The central issue here is easy to state, though difficult to
resolve: should losers' psychological attachments to benefits they
currently enjoy but to which they have a dubious claim of legal
entitlement be taken into account in evaluating the impacts of
imposing those losses? Or should those losses be valued only at
what the losers' would be willing to pay for them, i.e., their offer
prices? My choice here, concededly one with which reasonable
people may disagree, is to give primacy to the actual status quo of
the losers' current enjoyment of those benefits, rather than basing
the assessment upon the weak bargaining position that those
losers with dubious legal entitlements would have in a
hypothetical market-like negotiation among all affected parties, by
valuing those losses as well at the losers' asking prices. As a
theoretical matter, I recognize the desirability of adjusting those
asking prices downward where necessary to address Korobkin's
concerns that those asking prices may impound disutility from
selling and regret effects not properly included in the evaluation of
measures that will impose uncompensated losses, and then
adjusting them upwards to reflect any indignity from forced taking
effects. As a practical matter, however, I again believe that
unadjusted asking prices are as close as it is practically possible to
come to this theoretically correct figure given the severe data
limitations usually present.
It is unclear whether the potential valuation errors that may
be introduced if one uses unadjusted asking prices to measure cost
impacts will vary predictably with regard to whether the losses are
208. Kennedy, however, as noted above does regard the valuation of purely
vicarious disutility caused by another person's loss of an entitlement as
something that can be reasonably done through use of asking prices even
absent an entitlement to be spared such disutility.
See supra text
accompanying notes 100-01.
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of benefits protected by legal entitlements, or instead of benefits to
which the losers have no legal entitlement and perhaps even no
expectations of legal or social norm protection. Other things being
equal, a perception of entitlement could affect the strength of the
attachment effect with persons perhaps feeling stronger
attachments to benefits they not only enjoy, but also feel legally
entitled to enjoy. However, there may also be a larger disutility to
sell effect, a stronger regret effect, and a larger disutility from
forced taking effect generally associated with a stronger sense of
entitlement. There does not appear to be an adequate basis to
conclude whether failure to make the Korobkin downward
adjustments and the corollary disutility from forced taking effects
upward adjustment to asking price valuations will likely cause
more significant errors with regard to valuing costs associated
with the loss of entitlements than with regard to costs not so
associated.
e.

Summary

My overall conclusions as to the appropriate method of
valuing benefits and costs can be succinctly summarized. I first
recommend that cost-benefit analysts utilize the existing status
quo as the baseline from which all of the benefits and costs of a
measure under consideration are to be assessed. °9
I then
recommend that the benefits conferred by the implementation of a
measure be valued by the winners' offer prices.210
These
recommendations are relatively uncontroversial and are in accord
with most prior academic recommendations, governmental
commentary, and conventional practice.
With regard to the costs imposed by a measure, regardless of
whether they infringe upon existing legal entitlements, I
recommend that they be valued at the losers' asking prices. This
calls for a significant departure from the current widespread
practice of utilizing offer prices to measure cost impacts, which can
lead to very significant underestimates of actual "willingness to
pay." Partly for reasons of practicality, and partly because they
would result in partially or wholly offsetting adjustments, I
recommend that no attempt be made to incorporate the Korobkin
disutility from sale or regret effects downward adjustments to
asking prices, or the corollary disutility from forced taking effect
upward adjustments into the valuation procedures.
III. CONCLUSION
Cost-benefit analysis of the efficiency consequences of
proposed regulations is now an established and important part of
209. See supra text accompanying notes 190-91.
210. See supra text accompanying notes 191-94.
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the federal rulemaking process. If one engages in such analysis
attempting to assess the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency consequences of a
proposal, it is obviously crucial to correctly measure the
"willingness to pay" of the affected persons. This can only be done
if one first utilizes the appropriate baseline for determining
whether to classify the particular impacts of the proposal as costs
or benefits, and then correctly chooses between offer price and
asking price measures of this "willingness to pay" for different
impacts of the proposal under consideration.
Currently, the common practice of cost-benefit analysts is to
utilize the status quo baseline and the more easily obtained offer
prices"' to value all of the cost and benefit impacts of a proposal
from that baseline. As I have discussed, this is the appropriate
choice of evaluative baseline,212 and the correct method for valuing
the benefits of a proposal.213 However, I have also shown that this
is an incorrect approach to take in valuing the costs of a proposal,
which instead should be measured by the asking prices of the
affected persons. 2" The use of offer prices to measure costs may
21 5
often result in a substantial underestimate of those costs,
possibly resulting in an incorrect overall conclusion that the
proposal will promote economic efficiency when it will not in fact
do so. This problem is particularly likely when proposals are
evaluated that include among their impacts the imposition of
adverse environmental effects upon some persons whose asking
211
prices to bear such burdens far exceed their offer prices.
I call for cost-benefit analysts within the federal government
and elsewhere to critically reexamine their use of offer price
measures of costs. First, they should consider in each instance
whether they will in fact have significantly greater ease in
obtaining offer price measurements of a particular class of cost
impacts than in obtaining asking price measurements. If so, they
211. OMB (1996), supra note 31, at 22.
212. See supra text accompanying notes 190-91.
213. See supra text accompanying notes 191-94.
214. See supra text accompanying notes 195-210.
215. 'The valuation disparity [between offer prices and asking prices]
findings suggest that most economic assessments of losses will be seriously
understated if willingness to pay measures [offer prices] are used, and
decisions will likely be biased because of this." Knetsch (1990), supra note 33,
at 230.
216.
However, if environmental degradation...
imposes losses on
individuals, this usual practice of using... [offer price measures of
willingness to pay] will likely lead to large understatements of the
welfare changes.
As a consequence, too many environmentally
disruptive projects will be encouraged, too many harmful activities will
be allowed, inadequate mitigation measures will be undertaken when
environmental values are at risk ....
Id. at 231.
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should then consider whether this data collection cost advantage is
sufficient to justify introducing downwardly-biased measurement
errors of uncertain and potentially large size into the analysis,
risking a radical underestimation of the costs of the proposal being
evaluated. There are times, to be sure, where only a very "roughand-ready" assessment of efficiency consequences is needed for
assistance in decision-making and where minimizing the data
collection costs is a paramount consideration.
Under those
circumstances, the use of offer prices to value cost impacts may be
justified despite the potential strong bias in favor of the proposal's
implementation that may thereby be introduced. However, there
certainly are many other instances where accuracy of cost
valuation and efficiency assessment is sufficiently important to
merit the efforts necessary to obtain credible asking price data. A
preliminary determination of when an adequate cost-benefit
analysis for the decision at issue will require more accurate asking
price measures of particular cost impacts needs to be made as a
regular part of the analytical effort.

